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Background 
1. Following marking issues being notified to us by OCR over the course of the 
summer 2014 series that put at risk the delivery of GCSE and A level results, 
we decided on 16th September1 to carry out an investigation. 
2. The terms of reference for our investigation identified the purpose as being to: 
 establish the facts and understand how the issues in relation to the 
marking of summer 2014 GCSE and A level qualifications occurred and 
what the consequences were for awarding and results; 
 satisfy ourselves that OCR’s internal review was an open and honest 
review of summer 2014 marking to identify, recognise and accept the 
issues identified and to recommend action to mitigate the issues for any 
future series; and 
 to establish whether there was evidence to suggest we should be taking 
regulatory action. 
3. The terms of reference identified the areas for investigation as: 
 the adequacy of OCR’s risk identification and contingency planning 
arrangements ahead of summer 2014 marking, including an 
understanding of: 
 the completeness of risk identification and contingency planning; 
 factors affecting risk identification and contingency planning; 
 implementation of 100 per cent e-marking using OCR’s web 
assessor platform (scoris web assessor); and 
 the web assessor functionality issues that affected marking; 
 the arrangements OCR had in place to track the progress of marking in 
the summer and to escalate issues when they arose, including an 
understanding of: 
 availability of management information; 
                                            
 
1 All dates in this report refer to the calendar year 2014 unless stated otherwise. 
 Ofqual Investigation into OCR’s Summer 2014 
GCSE and A Level Marking Issues – Findings 
Ofqual 2015 3 
 operation of any internal risk escalation process; 
 consequences for marking and awarding deadlines; and 
 cross-business working; 
 the awareness and understanding of OCR management throughout the 
summer of the risks to delivering marking on time, including an 
understanding of: 
 decision-making in response to issues affecting marking; and 
 factors affecting OCR management’s awareness and understanding; 
 the accuracy and completeness of OCR’s reporting to Ofqual throughout 
the summer marking incident, including an understanding of: 
 the accuracy of data and information available to OCR; and 
 the effectiveness of reporting mechanisms; and 
 whether OCR provided appropriate assurance to Ofqual throughout the 
summer marking incident. 
Methodology 
4. Over approximately a five-week period we carried out a desk-based review of 
all relevant documentation, including reports from OCR’s own review into the 
summer 2014 series and OCR’s restructure transition. We also interviewed a 
number of OCR staff at all levels and from all relevant business areas. 
OCR’s review of the summer 2014 exam series 
5. OCR carried out its own review into what happened in summer 2014 and 
identified possible reasons why. On 20th August 2014 OCR produced a 
preliminary review report. This review was an instinctive view from OCR 
management as to what happened. OCR confirmed that the preliminary review 
report would act as a blueprint for the questions that its full review needed to 
address. 
6. On 17th October 2014 we received an update from OCR on the themes that 
emerged from its full review: 
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 Issues with web assessor functionality led to a transient shortfall in 
marking, which recovered at least in the short to medium term. However it 
did lead to an increase in the number of assessors2 dropping out. 
 Fragmented governance at OCR was a critical weakness. OCR did not 
have a holistic understanding of the end-to-end process of marking 
through to the issue of results. This impacted on its understanding of the 
data exchange and UCAS deadlines. 
 As a result of the fragmented governance, there was insufficient 
contingency planning and linking of risks.  
 Web assessor functionality problems used up marking contingency 
planning time without OCR having a full understanding of the potential 
implications. 
 OCR needs a better understanding of the marking and awarding 
processes and how to make the assessor body more responsive. OCR 
intends to apply this understanding to its planning for future summer 
series. 
 OCR needs to implement better management information reporting. 
 OCR needs better oversight for when things go wrong, including clearer 
accountabilities and a focus on risk escalation. 
 OCR underestimated the impact of its restructure on the assessor 
community – specifically, the negative impact from the loss of the 
qualification manager role on: 
 the support provided to assessors; 
 the value of the qualification managers’ working relationships with 
assessors; and  
 the mobilisation of assessors when marking rates deteriorated.  
 With the qualification manager role removed, OCR’s poor visibility of 
assessors’ availability throughout the full period of marking became 
apparent, especially as key marking deadlines approached. 
                                            
 
2 OCR usually refers to examiners as assessors and we use this terminology throughout this report. 
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 There was inadequate planning for some assessor shortfalls. 
 OCR was not sighted  on the commitments and availability of assessors 
throughout the whole marking period.  
7. OCR provided us with a copy of its final review report on 3rd November 2014. 
Relevant evidence from this report has been included as supporting evidence 
for our investigation findings.  
Findings from our investigation 
Summary 
8. Ahead of marking and awarding summer 2014 GCSE and A level papers, OCR 
had a number of significant and known risks not present in other recent summer 
series.  
9. First, like other exam boards, in 2014 OCR offered no January series and re-sit 
opportunities for GCSE and A level. This linearisation meant that OCR had 
approximately 900,000 more scripts to mark in summer 2014 than in previous 
series.  
10. Second, OCR had introduced an additional level of monitoring for summer 2014 
and, as such, had anticipated that this would result in more assessors being 
stopped from marking than in previous summer series.3 
11. Third, OCR introduced a more robust standardisation process intended to 
remove inconsistencies across the different stages of the standardisation 
process. OCR’s final review report identified that its estimation that this new 
process would extend the timescales by two to three days was an 
underestimation and that in most cases it took up to a week to clear assessors 
through standardisation (p 42, AS09). 
12. Fourth, in summer 2014 OCR moved to 100 per cent e-marking for the first time 
and implemented a new web-based version of their electronic script marking 
system (scoris web assessor). There were certain functionality issues with 
                                            
 
3 Across all exam boards, in every exam series, assessors are stopped from marking temporarily 
and/or permanently if the exam board’s live monitoring of their marking suggests they are not following 
the marking standard. 
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scoris web assessor that contributed to OCR’s subsequent significant marking 
issues later on in the marking window.4  
13. Fifth, OCR had been involved in an intensive restructure programme over the 
preceding 12 months. As OCR’s preliminary review report and transition 
delivery review reveal, the time and resources spent implementing the 
restructure, plus uncertainty among staff, had limited the effect of contingency 
planning undertaken for events such as the scoris web assessor performance 
issues.5 OCR also introduced a new governance structure in January 2014 that 
emphasised the management of accountabilities, including business planning 
for each business area. Also, and crucially, the restructure had removed the 
qualification manager structure (approximately 120 personnel) who had 
previously been the primary operational interface with assessors during the 
marking period. The qualification managers were replaced by a new 
Examinations & Assessor team that had responsibility for monitoring and 
managing the quality and quantity of marking and determining what 
interventions and actions were needed. This was in conjunction with the 21 
chairs of examiners who now had an enhanced role in recruiting and managing 
senior assessors. The change to the qualification manager structure took effect 
from January 2014.  
14. The restructure transition was signed off as complete at the end of March/early 
April 2014. OCR commissioned a post-implementation review to look at the 
effectiveness of the Transition Delivery Group. We received a copy of the 
Transition Delivery Review report on 3rd November 2014. Relevant evidence 
from this review has been included in this report. 
15. The executive summary of OCR’s final review report stated: “OCR came very 
close to missing major external deadlines during the summer 2014 series. OCR 
demonstrated characteristic resilience in dealing with the summer’s problems. 
Those problems should never have arisen.” 
                                            
 
4 The problems with scoris assessor functionality from early June through to when performance 
stabilised in mid to late June did have an impact on marking rates as June progressed into July and 
towards marking completion deadlines. Yet while linked, they are also separate incidents and should 
not necessarily be conflated when considering the evidence. 
5 The preliminary review report also said: “A principal risk of undertaking the business restructure and 
re-organisation over the six months prior to the series was that it might result in insufficient planning 
and preparation for the summer series.” This appears to contradict where the preliminary review report 
accepted that the restructure had limited planning. 
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16. The critical findings of our investigation, which run through this report are as 
follows: 
 OCR’s restructure impacted on the summer 2014 series. In particular, the 
qualification manager structure was removed without a full understanding 
and mapping of how qualification managers interfaced with assessors – 
including the support qualification managers provided to assessors during 
marking and managing the marking itself. 
 OCR had limited understanding of assessors’ availability. 
 There was fragmented governance and a lack of clarity in key roles and 
responsibilities in managing marking. 
 There was a lack of understanding among key senior managers of the 
end-to-end process of marking and awarding. This affected their ability to 
see the link between the scoris performance issues early in June and the 
potential for its impact on marking shortfalls and hitting marking deadlines. 
 There was no cross-business contingency planning and risk identification. 
 Senior managers were working with flawed understanding and 
assumptions. 
 OCR’s third-party control within a syndicate structure context was a 
contributing factor to some of the issues identified. 
Area of investigation 1: the adequacy of OCR’s risk identification 
and contingency planning arrangements ahead of summer 2014 
marking 
The completeness of risk identification and contingency planning 
17. Within the separate business areas of Assessment Standards, Examinations & 
Assessor and Operations there was evidence of some risk identification and 
mitigation, together with associated contingency planning, having taken place in 
preparation for the summer 2014 series. However, the standard of the 
documentation is variable. Specifically: 
 The Assessment Management Group developed an action plan for 
managing assessor shortfalls together with pre- and post-assessment risk 
and control registers. The registers had two generic risks relating to the 
additional risks OCR faced that summer. One referred to assessor 
shortages relating to a number of factors, including new subjects moving 
to scoris. The other referred to unintended consequences from the 100 per 
cent e-marking project not being fully understood. Specific risks were not 
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identified within these generic risks. The risk registers summarised 
controls but additional details of the controls that related specifically to 
assessor shortages could be found in the assessor action plan (created by 
the Assessment Management Group on February 2014) and in further 
information submitted by OCR. 
 The 21 chairs of examiners each completed risk assessments for their 
own qualifications. The Standardisation and Marker Monitoring risk 
assessment template identified risks for pre-standardisation checks, 
training requirements, panel design, at standardisation and monitoring of 
marking quality followed by an actions column. A sample of these risk 
assessments showed they were completed to a variable standard – 
ranging from detailed mitigating actions to hardly any detail at all. Also, the 
risk assessments appeared to be evolving documents not signed off by 
chairs until later in August. This raises the question of how and whether 
they were quality checked. Although these assessments were escalated to 
the Assessment Management Group, they did not feature as part of the 
product delivery risk register that covered many other aspects of 
assessment business processes. The Head of the Examinations & 
Assessor team was not fully sighted on these risk assessments, even 
though there are three risks identified within the panel design section that 
refer to assessors not completing marking on time and anticipating a 
significant impact from linearisation.  
 OCR provided an update to Ofqual on 20th October, which also identified 
that “weekly contingency planning meetings were held to resolve any 
outstanding issues for standardisation meetings scheduled in the next two 
weeks”. These were also called standardisation monitoring meetings and 
ran from 14th March to 30th June. OCR’s final review report identified that 
“at the point of planning the meetings it was not clear exactly what issues 
they would need to address, but that with the transition and with the new 
processes there were likely to be issues that had not been directly planned 
for…” (p 38, Finding AS07). The meetings were not intended to replace 
the support previously given by qualification managers (for example, if 
principal examiners expressed difficulties in the use of scoris). In an 
interview between OCR and Ofqual it was confirmed that there were no 
formal agendas or minutes for these meetings. OCR also identified a 
number of other planning actions in preparation for marking, including: “a 
telephone support rota of experienced ex-QMs [qualification managers] 
established to deal with queries from senior examiners who might 
encounter difficulties during the standardisation/approval period”; “all 
senior examiners were provided with face to face or remote training to 
prepare them for roll-out of quality of marking initiatives”; “the modifying of 
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all relevant working instructions to reflect roll-out of quality of marking 
initiatives”; and “a rota of deputy chairs drawn up to be used as support for 
senior examiners”. 
 OCR’s Operations area commissioned a number of short business 
readiness reports on the 100 per cent e-marking programme. These 
looked at OCR’s approach to managing risks during the June 2014 series:  
 The first report Scoris Web Assessor Performance Readiness looked 
at the stability and performance of scoris web assessor. It outlined 
that performance issues with scoris web assessor had been 
previously reported by Cambridge Assessment markers in both the 
November 2013 and January 2014 series, but these had been 
addressed in the March 2014 release of the platform. It also 
contained half a page on what to do “if the worst happens” – which 
provided limited detail. For example, it identified the contingency of 
reverting back to the scoris classic platform but with no indication of 
how this would be done and against what criteria/set of principles. 
We found no evidence of a reversion plan in place ahead of OCR 
assessors starting to use the new web assessor platform.  
 The second report June 2014 Series e-Marking Readiness outlined 
how, following transition, capacity, process and functionality 
changes, and internal process ownership (specifically the removal of 
the qualification manager structure) were being managed.  
18. Ahead of the summer 2014 series, there was no single, cross-business 
contingency plan and/or risk register that brought together and, where 
necessary, linked all cross-business risks and mitigating actions in relation to 
marking, awarding and post-assessment. OCR was unable to present any 
evidence to show that the planning for the summer series was reviewed and/or 
signed off at the Senior Management team/Responsible Officer level at any 
point. OCR’s preliminary review report also acknowledged that a principal risk 
from restructuring during the six months prior to the summer series was 
insufficient planning and preparation for the summer series. A critical weakness 
affecting contingency planning and linking of risks ahead of the summer series 
was fragmented governance and that OCR did not have a holistic 
understanding of the end-to-end process of marking through to issue of results. 
Web assessor functionality problems ultimately used up any marking 
contingency planning time without OCR having a full understanding, at the time, 
of the potential implications.  
19. OCR’s final review report identified that: “There is less evidence of a common 
understanding of, and central responsibility for, the end-to-end awarding and 
 Ofqual Investigation into OCR’s Summer 2014 
GCSE and A Level Marking Issues – Findings 
Ofqual 2015 10 
marking processes” (p 4)6 and “OCR experienced significant changes that had 
an impact on the planning for the series” (p 5). It also said: “The shortened 
timescale available for pre-assessment planning hampered effective scheduling 
and the identification of critical dependencies.” And: “Reflecting the fragmented 
nature of governance, contingency planning was done in isolation, rather than in 
a joined way across the whole marking and awarding process. (p 5) ” Further, 
still referring to planning and management of risks, the final review report 
identified that: “Without a clear understanding of, or responsibility for, the critical 
milestones throughout the end-to-end process it wasn’t possible to understand 
the consequences of missing them. As a consequence there was insufficient 
contingency planning against OCR’s principal risks… contingency planning was 
done in isolation rather than in a joined up way across the whole marking and 
awarding process” (p 11). The final review report identified that the extent of 
business change required additional planning and concludes that “some of this 
planning activity was disjointed and a little too reactive – there was no real 
opportunity to say ‘this is the plan for the June series, we are ready to go’ from 
a steady position” (p 18, Finding Pre-PS02).  
20. OCR’s transition delivery review identified “gaps in clarity and understanding 
limiting the extent to which Transition was able to control the risks around some 
of the activities in which it was involved. Not all planning activity was being 
overseen by Transition, and Transition’s role in all of the activity it engaged with 
wasn’t fully defined. The fragmented oversight of planning for the June 2014 
series contributed to gaps in the end-to-end planning of process delivery which 
affected the smooth running of the June 2014 Series” (p 9). Specifically in 
relation to contingencies and testing, the transition delivery review identified 
that: “The focus of Transition was on the re-alignment of responsibilities for 
tasks within processes. Whether for reasons of time or failure to plan, 
insufficient emphasis was given to the testing of new arrangements of the 
development of contingencies in the event of failure (p 9).” And: “The lack of 
contingency & scenario planning, and subsequent testing of processes, limited 
the control that OCR could potentially exercise over the management of risks to 
the June 2014 series. When issues arise contingencies have to be developed 
‘on the fly’, taking more time and resource than if contingencies are planned in 
advance (p 10).” 
21. A more robust standardisation process, designed to address inconsistencies 
between various stages of the process and different scripts, was introduced 
alongside the move to 100 per cent e-marking. There is evidence to show that 
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this was another factor that impacted on marking as a whole, extending 
standardisation time to about a week in most cases. There is no clear evidence 
that on its own it was a significant factor in contributing to subsequent marking 
delays and the exceptional number of assessors who dropped out of marking. 
However, OCR’s final review report identified that the new standardisation 
process “contributed to examiner drop out” and that “the extent of the drop outs 
was not factored in to any additional recruitment requirements because it was 
not known to be a risk” (p 29, Finding Post-E&A 03). Towards the latter stages 
of marking, when the standardisation of additional assessors became 
increasingly time critical, OCR developed the capability to hold additional face-
to-face or remote standardisation meetings at any point up to 60 hours prior to 
the last marking deadline. 
22. OCR, in common with the other exam boards, experienced a significant 
increase in the volume of scripts to mark (approximately 900,000 extra scripts 
according to OCR’s preliminary review report) due to the withdrawal of the 
January series. Recognising this, and based on entry figures, OCR determined 
that it needed around 15,800 assessors for the summer series. Allowing for 
those already in OCR’s total pool of assessors, this meant OCR aimed to recruit 
around 3,256 additional assessors (compared to the 787 additional assessors 
OCR determined it needed for summer 2013). This also anticipated a certain 
number of assessors who, as in any summer series, would drop out from 
marking and allowed for an increased number of assessors being stopped from 
marking due to the additional marking quality measures being introduced for the 
first time.7 
23. OCR entered marking with assessor shortfalls on some panels. The 
Deployment Shortage Report dated 28th May shows 17 panel shortages – two 
graded red (GCSE Additional Science B and GCSE Physics A) with 20–22 per 
cent shortfall, and the remainder graded amber with shortfalls varying between 
11 and 19 per cent (for GCSE and GCE History, GCSE and GCE separate 
sciences, GCSE English Literature, GCSE Religious Studies and GCE General 
Studies). OCR’s own review identified that insufficient planning on some panel 
shortages was a factor. A number of key panels went into the series with a 
shortage of assessors and there was no contingency pool of OCR-trained and 
standardised assessors. In interviews, OCR was clear that the spread and 
number of panel shortages was not exceptional and was less than in previous 
series – so giving confidence that OCR’s fallback contingencies (successful in 
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previous years) would again deliver marking to schedule. OCR also highlighted 
the national shortage of assessors in some subjects.  
24. Our analysis of assessor shortages by unit for the last three summer series 
shows that in mid-April the number of units with assessor shortages was not 
significantly different from the same point in time in 2013 and 2012. In 2014, 
there were 57 units with at least 20 per cent assessor shortfall at this point in 
time and 47 units with 10–20 per cent assessor shortages. This compares with 
51 units with 20 per cent+ and 53 units with 10–20 per cent in 2013, and 60 
units with 20 per cent+ and 53 units with 10–20 per cent in 2012. It is 
acknowledged that in 2013 and 2012 OCR met the awarding deadlines. 
25. OCR’s final review report identified that: “During transition when the panels 
were handed over from Cambridge Deployment to Coventry Deployment it 
became evident at this point that the panels procedures had not been followed 
in the Cambridge Deployment team and panels had to be 
reviewed/amended/reconstructed…” (p 16, Finding Pre-E&A01). And: “Panel 
plans were rolled over from previous series. This was not the ideal scenario as 
many of the panel plans ultimately were found to contain anomalies such as 
team leaders managing too many assessors or allocations which were over-
optimistic. These panel plans would have benefited from a review (currently 
underway for 2015 panels) and adjustment” (p 44, Finding Post-AS10). 
26. Data from OCR shows that by the end of marking, the number of additional 
assessors required had risen from 3,256 to 5,048. The majority of these were 
required as a result of the very high number of assessors dropping out from 
marking in combination with the need to not just fill the gaps but catch up 
marking from time lost because of the scoris web assessor performance issues.  
27. OCR recruited 3,744 additional assessors from the start of the recruitment 
campaign (September 2013) to the end of marking for the summer series. At 
any one point during marking there was a significant shortfall of assessors 
(1,495 by the end of marking). OCR does not fully record the reasons why 
assessors drop out, but it remains a possibility that the scoris performance 
issues experienced by OCR assessors impacted on the high drop-out rate. On 
10th June the drop-out figure was 850 (compared with 517 at the same point in 
2013), by 30th June it was 1,345 (compared with 958 in 2013), by 14th July it 
 Ofqual Investigation into OCR’s Summer 2014 
GCSE and A Level Marking Issues – Findings 
Ofqual 2015 13 
was 1,608 (compared with 1,196 in 2013) and by 31st July it was 1,684 
(compared with 1,285 in 2013), a 24 per cent increase.8  
28. The contingency (although not formally documented as such in a plan), as 
articulated by senior managers, was to use tried and tested approaches. These 
included: allocating more marking to assessors who had successfully completed 
50 per cent of their initial allocation; using financial incentives to increase 
existing assessors’ marking rates (on 13th June OCR offered a retainer to 
secure the services of assessors affected by the scoris performance issues 
and, in the very latter stages of marking, used significant, additional financial 
inducements); and recruiting and standardising more assessors to make up for 
those dropping out.  
29. There was no documented contingency plan exploring wider measures to deal 
with mass or exceptional loss of assessors over and above the tried and tested 
approaches described above – for example, testing whether there was full 
visibility of assessors’ availability throughout the entire marking period up to 
marking completion deadlines, or exploring how assessors from other exam 
boards could be used to support shortages. An emerging theme from OCR’s 
own review is that it was unsighted on the commitments and availability of 
assessors throughout the whole marking period. Towards the end of July, 
Ofqual suggested using assessors from other exam boards. However, it 
appears that this was not a contingency option considered within the industry as 
a whole.  
30. Senior managers acknowledged that the risk of implementing web assessor and 
moving to 100 per cent e-marking leading to significantly higher numbers of 
assessors dropping out was not as clear as it should have been. OCR 
submitted information to Ofqual in October 2014 citing the Examinations & 
Assessor team’s working instructions as the “contingency for panels where 
there are examiner shortfalls”. This document gives instructions on, for 
example, adding new assessors when available or increasing assessor 
allocations. However, it lacks the detail necessary to be considered a 
contingency plan for dealing with mass and/or exceptional loss of assessors as 
experienced in 2014 – as evidenced by the significant shortfall OCR had during 
marking that summer. OCR’s final review report stated: “OCR needs to review 
                                            
 
8 Figures provided by OCR. OCR’s final review report references 1,688 assessors dropping out in 
summer 2014, compared with 1,122 in summer 2013. It notes that it is not known how many drop-outs 
were caused by scoris performance issues, but concludes that these drop-outs “undermined the 
contingency provision” (p 17, Finding Pre-E&A02). Note the 24 per cent increase should be seen in 
the context of OCR having recruited more assessors for summer 2014 marking to take account of 
linearisation. 
 Ofqual Investigation into OCR’s Summer 2014 
GCSE and A Level Marking Issues – Findings 
Ofqual 2015 14 
the terms of engagement with examiners and assessors in terms of the end 
date of the task for Principal Examiners, the number of scripts examiners and 
assessors are allocated and some examiners and assessors behaviours” (p 17, 
Finding Pre-E&A03). 
31. OCR’s final review report has identified that a joined-up and strategic approach 
is required for the management of the totality of Cambridge Assessment’s 
assessors – particularly for those shared by OCR and CIE. It recommends that 
the syndicate and OCR board should receive regular reports on how this 
approach is working (p 15, Matters for the Syndicate, OCR Board and 
Cambridge Assessment Corporate Board). In interview, not all senior managers 
recognised the opportunities that this could present in terms of resilience of 
assessors. OCR’s final review report stated: “OCR must allocate appropriate 
resource and priority to the rapid development and implementation of ‘OCRs 
Examiner and Assessor Strategy’ (p 15, Recommendation 11). It also identified 
the need for “A formal schedule of real-time governance meetings to support 
future series” (p 11, Recommendation 4). In addition, OCR stated: “There is a 
role for Ofqual and other stakeholders within the UK assessment industry to 
encourage further participation of teachers – with the support of their employers 
– in the marking process” (p 14). 
32. There was also no documented specific contingency plan and/or associated risk 
register in place or scenario planning carried out should OCR potentially or 
actually miss any of the key marking deadlines. This included the last deadline 
for marks to be uploaded to UCAS. Only on 31st July did OCR begin to prepare 
a strategic response to UCAS, based on a number of scenarios, should OCR 
not have delivered all marks in time. 
33. OCR’s final review report said: “There is no stated process for dealing with late 
marking that impacts on post-sign off processes, as it has never been an issue 
before” (p 33, Finding Post-RTS01). This applies to final marking activities 
immediately ahead of the issue of results, such as special consideration, null 
response checks, uniform mark scale conversion checks and assessor scaling. 
In addition, the final review report identified that: “OCR’s awarding schedules 
based on old business rules did not have enough in-built contingency to 
account for the impact of changed processes and unforeseen marking issues” 
(p 36, Finding Post-AS03). Also, there is no documented process for actions 
required by the Chair, screeners and the Processing team when an award 
meeting takes place with less than 85 per cent of marks on the system.  
Factors affecting risk identification and contingency planning 
34. There were a number of factors that affected OCR’s risk identification and 
planning for that summer series.  
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 OCR’s restructure over the preceding 12 months  
35. OCR senior managers stated that the decision to restructure was driven by 
organisational need. OCR used the opportunity, provided by having no January 
series in 2014, to carry out the restructure. As OCR’s preliminary review report 
reveals (and interviewees, in general, agreed), the time and resources used to 
implement the restructure, plus uncertainty among staff, limited the amount of 
contingency planning that could be done for events such as the scoris web 
assessor performance issue. 
36. OCR also introduced a new governance structure in January 2014 that 
emphasised the management of accountabilities, including business planning, 
at the level of each business area, but had not provided for that planning to be 
effectively brought together. OCR’s final review report stated: “The restructuring 
process and externally driven timescales put pressure on OCR’s ability to 
embed its change programme and meant that planning time for the delivery of 
the 2014 series was severely limited” (p 11). While this may have been a factor 
for OCR – although OCR knew well ahead what the external timescales were 
and in 2014 they were reduced as there was no January series – arguably 
another more important factor was OCR not fully considering the restructure in 
terms of the impact on managing marking and assessors. 
37. OCR’s transition delivery review identified the following points:  
 “The timescales involved limited the effectiveness of the Transition given 
that not only was OCR trying to accommodate internal change but also 
external change in terms of linearization and the loss of the January 
series. The timing of the restructure and the resulting legal consultation left 
very little time to undertake fully effective planning of new processes and 
or even the testing of existing processes with new responsibilities. 
Processes will now need to be reviewed, and where appropriate, resource 
re-assessed to ensure that requirements can be efficiently and effectively 
delivered” (p 4). 
 “The clarity of the role of the specific Transition work stream was also a 
limiting factor in its effectiveness. In some respects its role was clear, and 
agreement was reached on some specific processes. However, the 
requirements of the Transition work stream in other areas of activity, 
notably filling the gaps left by the removal of the QM role, and the 
handover between Transition and AMG [Assessment Management Group] 
were less clearly defined / adhered to. Assumptions were made about who 
was overseeing planning, and these assumptions went unchallenged, 
which led to gaps in the end-to-end planning for the June 2014 series. In 
all cases decisions were made based on the best understanding at the 
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time, some of which subsequently proved to be flawed.” And: “Due to the 
timing of the re-organisation and subsequent consultation there was 
insufficient time to re-engineer processes, and insufficient emphasis given 
to testing the existing processes or to pre-planning contingencies in the 
event that a process did not perform as expected. This did not mean a 
complete lack of contingencies as many have been tried and tested in 
parts over the years, but as they are often not documented they rely on 
individual knowledge and many of those individuals had either left OCR or 
now had a different focus” (p 4). 
 “In effect OCR had to plan to deliver mainly legacy processes with far less 
resource than it had had in June 2013. As a result some staff were 
incredibly stretched and asked to fulfil roles for which they were not 
adequately prepared, while some processes were fragmented due to the 
need to find resource rather than develop appropriately connected end-to-
end processes” (p 6).  
 “In terms of process detail, verbal assurance was provided on 29 May that 
working instructions had been reviewed as fit for delivery of the June 2014 
Series. No more definite criteria were given. A brief audit of working 
instructions conducted on 3 June found some inconsistencies in the 
assurances given to the Transition Delivery Group, including the Missing & 
Incomplete Results Working Procedures labelled ‘Draft’ with no assurance 
they had been approved, and no assurance had been received or sought 
from Assessment Standards outside of that given by Examiners & 
Assessors. This was not followed up by a more structured approach to re-
assurance, with clear criteria, but a second request for verbal assurance” 
(p 8). 
38. Crucially, the restructure had removed the qualification manager structure that 
had been the primary operational interface with assessors during the marking 
period. All senior managers agreed that the insight that qualification managers 
had in the micro-managing of marking on a unit-by-unit basis and the 
understanding of individual assessor relationships and communication was not 
formalised for the assessor population as a whole within any documented 
working instructions. When the qualification manager structure was dismantled 
the probability is that much of this knowledge was lost. OCR’s own review has 
identified this as a key factor: that the impact of restructure on the assessor 
community was underestimated – specifically, the close support of assessors 
the qualification managers took on, the value of their working relationships with 
assessors, and how the loss of the qualification manager role made mobilisation 
of assessors more difficult when marking rates deteriorated. During the 
investigation OCR expressed the view that the role of the qualification manager 
was fundamentally untenable going forward. Furthermore, it said that the 
 Ofqual Investigation into OCR’s Summer 2014 
GCSE and A Level Marking Issues – Findings 
Ofqual 2015 17 
marking issues raised early in 2014 around history and English supported this 
view.  
39. OCR’s final review report stated: “Weaknesses in legacy arrangements have 
hitherto been compensated for by the ad hoc personal relationships that existed 
between assessors and QMs” (p 14, Working with the assessor community). 
And: “It is apparent that the full scope of the QM’s role was not captured by the 
change programme (p 14).” In addition, the final review report concluded: 
“Fundamentally, the QMs seem to have fulfilled a ‘security blanket role’ for 
some senior examiners, and the full impact on confidence of removing that was 
not anticipated in transition planning (largely because it shouldn’t have to have 
been)…” (p 39, Finding Post-AS07).  
40. The final review report also identified that OCR failed to understand the role 
qualification managers played in managing assessors’ “frustrations” regarding 
system issues: “The lack of scoris knowledge within the business led to a drop 
in the level of in-series support for senior assessors, particularly at SSU 
[Standardisation Setup] meetings” (p 48, Finding Post-AS13). It also said: “The 
accountability of Senior Assessors was perhaps also not made clear enough to 
them in terms of their responsibility to manage the teams to achieve targets, or 
the timeframes this would span. The responsibility of managing teams to 
achieve marking deadlines had in most cases been taken up by the QMs in the 
past” (p 50, Finding Post-AS14). 
41. Another impact of the restructure was in relation to the “QM/QL Task List” (a 
strand of work to assign responsibility for tasks formerly undertaken by 
qualification managers). OCR’s transition delivery review identified that: “This 
was achieved, and owners were agreed for all tasks as part of Transition. 
However, the list originated before Transition began, and many of these tasks 
were not fully understood by OCR until the new owners began to implement 
them, long after they had agreed their staff resources in 2013, by which time it 
was difficult to do anything other than use temporary staff. This had resource 
implications for some parts of the business” (p 8). 
42. OCR’s preliminary review report identified that, following the restructure, the 
new Examinations & Assessor team had been under-resourced form the outset. 
A data analysis role for the Examinations & Assessor team was only recognised 
as being necessary as the series progressed. An additional quality support and 
monitoring manager also had to be added. There is no significant body of 
evidence to suggest that these resource issues had a major impact on OCR 
being able to respond in the latter stage of marking by the end of July/early 
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August, although it did affect the service to assessors.9 Resources from 
elsewhere in the organisation, including some ex-qualification managers, were 
drafted in to support the deployment of assessors and the telephoning of 
assessors who had either finished marking or had dropped out to see if they 
were available to take on additional marking.  
43. The restructure had also not addressed some single-person dependency 
vulnerability. A number of critical roles required during the course of the marking 
and awarding process were staffed by the same individuals. OCR’s final review 
report identified that before the restructure, the qualification managers provided 
a trained source of knowledge about scoris and/or ModMan:10 “Post the 
restructure there was knowledge gap and an over reliance on one individual in 
the business who was the single point of contact regarding scoris/ModMan 
issues/knowledge” (p 28, Finding Post-E&A01). It also said: “The issue of poor 
management information was not adequately recognised in planning and its 
consequences foreseen” (p 6, Informed decision making). And: “There was 
insufficient ‘expert’ business resource to support OCR’s data/management 
information requirements during the live delivery cycle (p 13).”  
44. The final review report briefly outlined concerns about how OCR’s “historical 
business model” managed its assessor community: “OCR’s change programme 
recognised the shortcomings of its historic business model and dispensed with 
QMs” (p 14).  
45. The question of whether OCR considered reforming the qualification manager 
model instead of dispensing with it did not form part of this investigation. 
 OCR’s placement within wider syndicates 
OCR is one business unit within the Cambridge Assessment Syndicate. The 
syndicate also contains CIE and Cambridge English awarding organisations. The 
syndicate is provided with technical services (including scoris) by a third-party 
supplier, RM Education. The interface between OCR and RM is through another 
syndicate function, the Group Infrastructure Services Directorate. OCR’s final review 
report identified that OCR’s relationship with the Infrastructure Services Directorate 
and how the cross-business stream ESM group works has been brought into 
question. OCR’s final review report identified that: “Two cross-stream governance 
groups (with representation from RM, IS and the 3 Business units – OCR, CIE and 
Cambridge English) are defined within the Managed Service Agreement” (p 23, 
                                            
 
9 There is more detail about this in the section “Area of investigation 3” in this report. 
10 OCR’s system for managing on-screen moderation of internal assessment. 
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Finding PS10). The first of these groups – “The ESM Strategic Operations Board 
(largely, in place to oversee the strategic aspects of the managed service and the 
highest point of escalation (p 23)” –had not met for at least 12 months before the 
summer 2014 series as it was previously agreed it would meet by exception only. 
Following the summer marking incident, the strategic group had re-started regular 
meetings. The second of these groups – “The ESM Operating Board, charged with 
management of the managed service, risk/escalated issue management, commercial 
oversight” – had met “over recent months (p 24)”. In late May/early June there is 
evidence that it had responded to scoris performance issues.  
 
46. OCR was of the view that the relationship with the Infrastructure Services 
Directorate had not worked well. It had been difficult to get assurances that the 
Infrastructure Services Directorate and therefore RM fully understood the scale 
of what assessors were reporting to OCR about the scoris web assessor 
performance issues in the early days, and therefore the implications for 
marking. OCR’s final review report stated: “The customer-supplier relationship 
between OCR and Group ISD [Infrastructure Services Directorate] has not 
worked well, given that these two entities reside within the same Group. OCR 
has worked on the presumption that ISD has the requisite technical and 
contract management skills. OCR has therefore taken a ‘light touch’ approach 
to the governance of ISD. This suggests that OCR did not challenge ISD 
sufficiently as to the robustness of the reassurances being received from RM… 
This requires an overhaul of the OCR-ISD relationship to ensure Cambridge 
Assessment retains the benefits of a centralised IT function, whilst recognising 
the need for improvement of RM” (p 5). In addition, the final review report 
identified that: “There is little evidence to suggest OCR’s staff demonstrated 
sufficient abilities to act as an ‘intelligent customer’. OCR has not been very 
good at articulating its requirements and the changes it requires, for example in 
respect of the new standardisation approach” (p 12). 
47. OCR does not have a formal service level agreement with the Infrastructure 
Services Directorate for how it supports OCR in working with RM. RM does not 
have a service level agreement directly with OCR in relation to ESM – rather it 
relies on service levels as defined in the contract between the Infrastructure 
Services Directorate and RM. In interview, the Infrastructure Services 
Directorate was not clear where ownership/responsibility lay for the fact that 
scoris web assessor did not function properly for OCR assessors. It could not 
recall who from its side of the business reviewed the testing evidence from RM. 
The Infrastructure Services Directorate believed it was OCR’s responsibility to 
be satisfied that sufficient testing of, and contingency planning for, the first 
volume use of the scoris web assessor platform was carried out.  
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 OCR’s relationship with UCAS 
48. OCR’s preliminary review report stated that its relationship with UCAS has been 
“arm’s length and limited. Other than a formal letter, there were few formalised 
protocols and processes and no explicit agreement on specifics such as the 
size of acceptable amendment files (p 7)”. In interviews, OCR acknowledged 
this. The nature of this relationship impacted on OCR’s rationale when it came 
to providing Ofqual with assurances, as well as its planning for marking 
contingencies as measured against key marking deadlines. OCR’s final review 
report identified that: “Importantly the significance of failure to deliver the 
required data to the 7 August UCAS deadline was not fully appreciated or 
factored into the series planning” (p 5).11  
 OCR’s understanding of the end-to-end marking and awarding process 
49. OCR did not have a common and effective understanding of, or central 
responsibility for, the end-to-end marking and awarding process. OCR’s final 
review report (p 4) confirms this, describing OCR thinking “of itself in 
organisational/structural terms as ‘What Operations does’ and ‘What 
Assessment Standards does’ rather than focusing on the end-to-end process 
that drives outputs”. This was apparent during the interviews with OCR and is 
also demonstrated by a lack of centralised contingency planning and risk 
identification documentation.12  
 Processes were not always fully understood or mapped 
50. Not all of the sub-business processes that were at the end of the main marking 
period were fully understood and properly mapped. In interviews, OCR 
acknowledged not being fully sighted on these processes and the time needed 
to complete them. OCR’s final review report said: “There is no stated process 
for dealing with late marking that impacts on post-sign off processes, as it has 
never been an issue before” (p 33, Finding Post-RTS01). This applies to final 
marking activities immediately ahead of the issue of results such as special 
consideration, null response checks, uniform mark scale conversion checks and 
assessor scaling.  
Implementation of 100 per cent e-marking using the scoris web assessor 
platform 
51. OCR has been moving towards 100 per cent e-marking for a number of years. 
Prior to that summer OCR used both e-marking and traditional paper marking of 
                                            
 
11 There is more detail about this in the section “Area of investigation 3” in this report. 
12 There is more detail about this in the section “Area of investigation 3” in this report. 
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scripts. OCR decided to move to 100 per cent e-marking for summer 2014 
using scoris web assessor, which had enhanced functionality compared to the 
previous system. In 2013, a Programme Board for transition to 100 per cent e-
marking was set up. 
52. A number of short business readiness reports about the 100 per cent e-marking 
programme summarised OCR’s approach to managing risks around the June 
2014 series. These were produced for OCR’s Senior Management team ahead 
of summer 2014 marking. One relates to scoris web assessor performance 
readiness and outlines, in principle, that if all else fails there is the ability to 
switch the majority of components back to the previous platform (scoris classic). 
OCR’s final review report stated: “Planning and work undertaken in seeking 
assurances from RM (documented at both the Programme Board and Operating 
Board) together with OCR’s planning outlined in the ‘WA Performance’ and ‘e-
Marking’ readiness reports demonstrated the due diligence/scenario planning 
undertaken for this migration. These were, ultimately, however unsuccessful in 
preventing the issues encountered” (p 21, Finding Post-PS01).  
53. However, other evidence appears to contradict this finding. First, interview 
evidence suggested that the principle of switching back to scoris classic as a 
contingency was based on an assumption or expectation that any reversion 
would be more limited than the reversion that occurred (in the end, 175 out of 
500 components were moved back to scoris classic). Second, OCR’s final 
review report identified that scoris web assessor was “Not planned for, there 
was an outline contingency for scoris failure but not for scoris issues on scale 
they occurred… The impact on standardisation in terms of time lost at meetings 
and time taken to clear examiners was not fully considered….” (p 40, Finding 
Post-AS08). Furthermore, OCR’s final review report stated that OCR “did not 
properly consider and identify risks around moving all panels to scoris Web 
Assessor in terms of load testing and required RM support. We possibly relied 
on information and assurances from RM and lacked thorough load testing” (p 
48, Finding Post-AS13). 
54. OCR was aware of the difficulty of moving long-form question marking back to 
scoris classic (although this only affected a small number of components). 
OCR’s preliminary review report identified that scoris classic did not have the 
functionality for long-form questions and therefore the contingencies for such 
papers were limited, unlike the shorter questions, which could be moved to 
scoris classic. 
55. The 100 per cent e-marking Programme Board papers identify that a risk-
reduction non-live pilot to prove the use of complex optionality (a feature of web 
assessor designed to deal with OCR question paper optionality) did not go 
ahead before the first live use of web assessor in summer 2014. When 
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interviewed, OCR was unable to provide any further detail/documentation on 
why this was the case. 
56. It appears that the testing carried out by RM as part of its planned release of 
web assessor for summer 2014 was based on a set of assumptions that did not 
sufficiently reflect the actual number of concurrent markers experienced in the 
June 2014 series. Additionally, and more crucially, it did not reflect how OCR 
assessors would use the system in live marking and as part of standardisation 
set-up. It is unclear from the interviews and documentation provided by OCR 
what sign-off there was by OCR or the Infrastructure Services Directorate 
regarding the effectiveness of the testing. OCR was of the view that it relied 
heavily on the Infrastructure Services Directorate for this, and the Infrastructure 
Services Directorate was evasive on this point. Much of the assurance assumed 
by OCR (and probably the Infrastructure Services Directorate) came from the 
use of scoris web assessor by CIE markers in volume in 2013 and OCR’s more 
limited use of it in 2013 with no significant functional issues being reported.  
57. OCR’s final review report identified that the flaws in the programming code in 
scoris web assessor, which caused the poor performance, were not identified 
either in live running for other RM customers despite relatively high volumes of 
scripts, or by the volume testing undertaken by RM. This was based on “RM’s 
assessment of the numbers of concurrent markers suggested by the capacity 
planning exercise but may not have taken full account of the higher than 
expected numbers of markers using the mark by question option or the scale of 
onsite concurrent standardisation setup activity” (p 25, Finding Post PS10). 
Furthermore, the final review report identified that: “CIE’s November series was 
seen as a test for OCR to determine a wholesale move to scoris web, this test 
has proved to be insufficient in terms of numbers” (p 30, Post-E&A05). 
58. RM did recommend (as indicated in the business readiness documentation) that 
assessors should use the familiarisation mode in advance of marking. This was 
to help identify any user/functionality issues. On 14th April 2014, assessors 
were e-mailed to inform them of the new web assessor release and of the 
familiarisation mode. The information was also included in the scoris web 
assessor marker guide on OCR’s website. No evidence has been provided to 
show whether, and if so how, either OCR or the Infrastructure Services 
Directorate collated and used information on which assessors used the 
familiarisation mode or any feedback from them about functionality.  
59. In December 2013, a number of email communications were sent to assessors 
to advise and explain about the use of scoris web assessor and the type of user 
equipment required by the assessors. However, there was no systematic 
approach to recording, checking or chasing up assessors to ensure they had 
read and acted on this information and no evidence was provided by OCR of 
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checking, even on a random sample basis. OCR’s final review report identified 
that OCR “should probably have anticipated the level of assessor unhappiness 
with changes and the loss of the QM who many principal examiners had 
established relationships with… the loss of examiner confidence in OCR 
probably contributed to un-willingness to mark more scripts… further down the 
line. We could also have communicated changes to senior examiners more 
effectively” (p 39, Finding Post AS07). 
60. There was no detailed plan for reverting to scoris classic in the event of a 
significant functionality issue with web assessor. A reversion plan was 
developed in the second week of June by OCR, the Infrastructure Services 
Directorate and RM. On 9th June, OCR circulated a paper outlining its “Plan B” 
if issues with scoris web assessor continued and performance was 
unacceptable. This paper identified that OCR’s visibility of RM’s contingency 
plan was poor and that “Given the significance of this system OCR’s 
contingency planning should have considered the possibility of system failure 
and have had the skeleton of contingency plan situation where the system is not 
available”. 
61. In preparation for the introduction of 100 per cent e-marking using scoris web 
assessor and potential technical issues being experienced by assessors, RM 
increased its help desk resource (by 60 per cent). However, going into marking 
the help desk only worked office hours (10.00 to 18.00 weekdays and 09.00 to 
17.00 weekends). Later on in June, in response to the scoris functionality 
issues, the help desk did operate an out-of-office-hours service. When 
interviewed, both OCR and the Infrastructure Services Directorate expressed 
surprise that RM’s help desk was not accessible outside office hours – although 
it appears this was in line with the contract in place with RM. It appears that 
neither OCR nor the Infrastructure Services Directorate had checked this, or if 
they had, did not challenge the arrangements. At the height of the functionality 
issues, RM was unable to cope with the volume of queries from assessors. This 
resulted in assessors further being delayed in starting or continuing with 
marking. OCR’s final review report confirms this ( Finding Post E&A13 p 33, 
Finding Post PS04 p 22). 
The scoris web assessor functionality issues affecting marking 
62. OCR’s evidence indicates that it first informed us of the scoris performance 
issues on 2nd June (preliminary review report, Appendix 1). Our records show 
that the first recorded notification (an email) was on 6th June, followed by an 
official event notification on 13th June. It was probable that in the first week in 
June, OCR, the Infrastructure Services Directorate and RM did not fully 
understand the full nature or scale, and therefore implications, of the emerging 
functionality issues.  
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63. A number of interviewees expressed the view that they found it difficult to get 
satisfactory responses from the Infrastructure Services Directorate and RM. 
OCR’s final review report stated: “It was not clear during the early part of the 
marking window as to the precise nature of the problem unfolding. There was a 
considerable amount of ‘noise’ coming into OCR… This intelligence was not 
collated in a central point and hence early warning of the impending problem 
was missed” (p 49, Finding Post AS13). However, by 10th/11th June, OCR, RM 
and Infrastructure Services Directorate crisis teams had been formed. Over the 
next few days, options and more detailed planning were developed for a 
reversion of units from scoris web assessor back to scoris classic, with the first 
units being reverted on or around 12th June. By, or slightly before, 24th June, 
175 (out of 500) components had been reverted to scoris classic. 
64. The principal issue with functionality resulted from a number of flaws in the 
programming code for scoris web assessor’s stored procedures (marking 
transactions). When used too often, as a result of how OCR assessors operated 
the system (for example, higher than expected numbers of assessors using the 
mark by question option), the functionality was adversely affected. The system 
‘froze’. Even when scoris web assessor was operating, the ability of assessors 
to log in and move around the system without ‘hanging’ was affected. The ability 
of the system to refresh quickly was also impacted.  
65. OCR also introduced a new, more robust standardisation process for summer 
2014. Where there was a large number of assessors being standardised, and 
all logging in at the same time, this added to scoris web assessor’s functionality 
problems and further slowed down the system. 
66. On or around 13th June, OCR offered a retainer to assessors impacted by 
scoris performance issues. However, as identified earlier in this report, a 
significant number of assessors still dropped out from marking. OCR’s final 
review report identified that “it took 2 weeks to stabilise scoris and some of the 
technical solutions proposed and adopted (at RM’s instigation and endorsed/not 
challenged by IS) led to further outages and performance issues. The impact on 
the marking window and on OCR assessors was protracted13 and recovery 
                                            
 
13 It is unclear what OCR means by ‘’protracted’’ in the context of the impact on marking shortfalls, 
particularly for GCE qualifications, later on in July. In OCR’s update to Ofqual on emerging themes 
from its review (at a meeting on 17th October) OCR stated that the scoris performance issues were a 
“red herring” when it came to the marking crisis as it had developed in July. In addition, the final review 
report provided data about batch marking and stated that “scoris issues may have had less impact on 
standardisation meetings and clearance and subsequent delays in marking than might be suggested 
by how far these panels then missed batch 2 dates by” (p 41, Post-AS08). Arguably, this implies that 
the cause of marking shortfalls may lie elsewhere. 
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(resolution of backlogged support calls and the marking rate) took longer than 
desirable” (p 21, Finding Post PS02). 
Area of investigation 2: the arrangements OCR had in place to track 
the progress of marking in the summer and to escalate issues when 
they arose 
Tracking progress of marking and availability of management information 
67. As evidenced earlier in this report, OCR’s restructure removed the qualification 
manager structure. Qualification managers essentially had been responsible for 
all aspects of their qualifications including being the main operational focus for 
monitoring marking progress together with the Assessor Deployment team. The 
qualification manager structure was replaced with an enhanced role for OCR’s 
21 chairs of examiners, specifically in recruiting senior assessors, who reported 
to the Head of Assessment Standards working with a new, more centralised 
Examinations & Assessor team that reported to the Head of the Examinations & 
Assessor team. This structure, led by the Examinations & Assessor team, was 
responsible for monitoring the quality and quantity of marking. 
68. For summer 2014, the mechanism to track and monitor marking consisted of a 
scoris marking status dashboard together with a watch list (and later on a 
separate section within it called a worry list) showing GCSE and GCE unit 
marking progress. OCR’s preliminary review report identified that the dashboard 
was only introduced after the scoris performance issue had been identified. 
From mid-June, the scoris dashboard and watch list was circulated daily 
internally to all key senior managers, together with the actions by chairs of 
examiners and the Deployment team resulting from the watch list information. 
From, on or around, 24th June, a small group of senior managers met daily to 
monitor the progress of marking data and decide on actions (these were 
recorded and titled as Assessment Management Group actions).  
69. In interview, Assessment Management Group members appeared to be unclear 
about whose lead responsibility it was to monitor marking, ensure action was 
taken and, if necessary, escalate concerns. OCR’s final review report stated: 
“What was not clear was the reporting/accountability relationship between the 
Head of E&A [Examinations & Assessor team] and the Director of Operations 
whose responsibility it was to ensure that results were published to agreed 
timelines. In particular, the accountability for monitoring and chasing marking 
progress was insufficiently clear – was it E&A or Ops? There was perhaps an 
assumption that it would take care of itself. And even if the accountability was 
known at senior level, then responsibility for monitoring progress of marking at 
subject/panel level was not clear… nobody had ownership for specific panels as 
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in the past” (pp 43–44, Finding Post AS10).14 Furthermore, the final review 
report identified that: “The newly re-configured AMG may not have reacted as 
swiftly and strongly to the emerging late marking issues as the situation later 
transpired to have required” (p 22, Finding Post PS03).15 
70. The scoris dashboard provided an overview of marking progress in 2014 
compared with the previous year. It also showed the total number of GCSE and 
GCE marks entered on file in the last day and week. The watch list provided, at 
unit level, a comprehensive range of information on marking progress including 
entries, number of scripts marked to date, percentage marking complete, 
remaining number of scripts to mark, number marked in last day/week, and 
projected completion date at the current daily/weekly rate. Each unit was 
Red/Amber/Green (RAG) rated and had commentary from the Chair of 
Examiners about what actions were being taken. The worry list identified those 
units where the projected marking completion date was further away (and 
crucially, beyond the key marking deadlines) or where the marking rate had 
deteriorated substantially. The judgement as to which unit went on the watch or 
worry list was determined on the basis of a number of factors, including 
qualification type, date of award, whether marking had achieved the 50 per cent 
point, and previous daily and weekly marking rates.  
71. Overall, Assessment Management Group members who used this mechanism 
thought it generally effective as a monitoring and flagging tool and an 
improvement on the previous system (a report form of marking progress 
maintained by each qualification manager but with less detail). OCR had used 
the watch list tracking mechanism before in the previous summer series – used 
by exception for a small number of panels where there were known assessor 
shortages and then to monitor any other panels where marking progress looked 
to be slowing.  
72. However, OCR’s final review report identified that “the level of detail in the 
Watch list, allied to the lack of reference to the significant dates for data 
submission, would not have highlighted the seriousness of the marking delays 
without additional detailed analysis” (pp 55–56, Findings XB04). This position is 
difficult to understand given that many of the projected marking completion 
dates, based on the previous 24-hour and week marking rates, were clearly 
                                            
 
14 This links to a finding in the transition delivery review about sign-off and planning at the high level 
but no assurance of detailed provision. 
15 Further information about the Assessment Management Group is provided in the next section of this 
report; Internal risk escalation during marking 
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shown in the July watch list to be well beyond the issue of results days in 
August. 
73. Assessment Management Group members were not clear about whether the 
watch list percentage of marks data referred to 100 per cent of marks or the 85 
per cent of whole candidate marks needed for awarding (when unit marks are 
aggregated the percentage of whole candidates on file will be lower). OCR’s 
final review report stated: “Daily AMG meetings identified at risk qualifications in 
terms of having less than 85% of the marks on the system in time for the award, 
however as this data was at unit level only it did not account for the number of 
aggregated candidates at qualification level. In many cases where individual 
units were above 85%… the overall % of graded candidates (aggregated) was 
below 85% and the awards could not be screened” (p 36, Finding Post AS05). 
74. Prior to summer 2014, there was “poor or non-existent management 
information” on historic marking rates of individual papers, so no marking rate 
benchmarks were available. Marking rate information for each component was 
gathered and monitored in 2013 by individual qualification managers. There 
was no centralised data set for 2013 that could be compared to 2014. A number 
of interviewees agreed that this information was not known. However, they felt 
that this was not as critical as the lack of visibility of assessors’ availability – 
specifically, not having a clear view of when they might stop marking, when they 
could be available to start marking again, and what marking they did for other 
boards. There was no electronic system in place with a complete picture of all 
OCR assessors’ marking availability. This presented significant problems for 
OCR in the latter stages of marking.  
75. OCR’s final review report identified that: “OCR had a limited understanding of 
assessor’s availability during the series” (p 14). And: “OCR was not aware of 
the availability of examiners outside the normal marking window as there are no 
systems or processes to collect and store this data.” It also stated that “when 
the marking shortfall was identified, OCR was not easily able to marshal the 
assessor community effectively”. In addition, the final review report identified 
that decision-making was affected in the early stages of marking by not having 
sufficient real-time management information (p 12, this possibly refers to 
availability of assessors) and that “Visibility of the progress of marking volumes 
during the series was poor at the start of the series” (p 44, Finding Post AS10). 
76. OCR’s final review report stated that as a consequence of the summer series 
issues, “damage to examiners morale” may impact on their willingness to 
accept subsequent invitations to mark for OCR (p 14, p 32, Finding Post 
E&A10).  
 Ofqual Investigation into OCR’s Summer 2014 
GCSE and A Level Marking Issues – Findings 
Ofqual 2015 28 
Internal risk escalation during marking 
77. OCR had an incident escalation process in place (Managing and Reporting 
Issues document) where incidents/issues were escalated to OCR’s Risk & 
Compliance team. Once a risk moved from a potential to a real event, it 
followed OCR’s Managing and Reporting Issues process. While a risk remained 
a potential event, escalation followed governance outlined in the OCR Risk 
Management Strategy (January 2014).  
78. The speed with which the scoris functionality performance issues came to light, 
in early June, meant that this escalation process was not used as the main 
mechanism for escalating to senior managers in the early days. OCR’s final 
review report identified that: “Different people within OCR, especially Process 
Managers supporting Standardisation Setup (SSU) meetings and Chairs of 
Examiners, became aware of these issues through anecdotal reports on 
performance” (p 7).  
79. The Assessment Management Group, as the principal management operational 
group for the Assessment business area, would normally escalate to OCR’s 
Senior Management team. In practice, the speed with which the scoris 
functionality issues developed and the fact that an OCR crisis team was put 
together by 10th/11th June consisting of the majority of OCR’s relevant senior 
managers meant that escalation had in reality taken place, albeit not through 
formal Assessment Management Group channels. 
80. There is evidence to show that, in the lead-up to and during the summer 2014 
marking period, there was confusion about the role of the Assessment 
Management Group in coordinating the managing of marking, and, where 
necessary, in escalating issues.  
81. OCR’s final review report identified “a lack of clarity” in the role of the 
Assessment Management Group (p 10). In addition: “There was a lack of clarity 
on who was accountable for monitoring and chasing marking progress – and 
who had oversight of the end-to-end marking and awarding process.” The final 
review report concluded: “There were different perspectives on the role of AMG. 
[Some] felt it was to monitor and manage the series and [others] felt it should 
provide assurance of sign-off (even though historically the AMG has never had 
an active role in pre-assessment or post-assessment signoff). AMG saw the 
prime responsibility for managing processes as sitting with Business Process 
Owners, with AMG as a forum to monitor, challenge and reach agreement on 
points at issue. This is what was reflected in the AMG Terms of Reference 
revised at the start of 2014. The Directors were not part of the process of 
revising the ToR when, as stakeholders, they should have been” (p 54, XB03). 
The final review report goes on to identify that: “The newly re-configured AMG 
may not have reacted as swiftly and strongly to the emerging late marking 
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issues as the situation later transpired to have required” (p 22, Finding post-
PS03). It also stated that: “AMG failed in its management role having become 
deflected from its main and most important task – that of having oversight of a 
live series” (p 44, Finding Post-AS10). Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand 
how this confusion was not identified and addressed well ahead of the series or 
at least during marking, especially when late marking issues emerged. The 
reconfigured Assessment Management Group started on or about 24th June 
and then met daily through the whole of the marking period. It consisted of 
senior operational managers. They received the watch lists that showed 
marking shortfalls during July, as did a group of key OCR directors who also 
contended that they were monitoring marking progress. 
82. OCR’s transition delivery review identified that in February 2014 the chairs of 
the Assessment Management Group and the Transition Delivery Group agreed 
that responsibility for monitoring standardisation would revert to the Assessment 
Management Group after high-level sign-off of the new arrangements (p 8). 
However, the relationship between the two groups may not have been clearly 
understood by all concerned. 
83. In relation to the progress of marking in July, there is evidence of some formal 
risk escalation from the daily meeting of Assessment Management Group 
members to OCR’s Senior Management team as a whole and on an individual 
basis as marking progressed. The Senior Management team decided on 
greater use of financial incentives for assessors.  
84. OCR’s Senior Management team members did not attend daily marking 
monitoring Assessment Management Group meetings, although they were 
copied into the daily circulated dashboard and watch lists. There is some 
evidence to support the Senior Management team’s assurances that they were 
sighted on marking through the dashboard and watch lists and did informally 
question marking progress. OCR’s final review report stated: “Marking progress 
continued to be monitored daily by both the AMG… and separately by a group 
of three directors covering Operations, Assessment Standards and Risk and 
Compliance and the CEO” (p 7). 
85. On 24th July, two members of the Screening team in OCR’s Research and 
Technical Standards identified concerns that imminent deadlines for providing 
results data to Ofqual and UCAS would be missed due to marking shortfalls. 
This issue was escalated to the CEO, the Director of Risk & Compliance (who 
was on leave), the Director of Operations and the Director of Assessment 
Standards. OCR’s final review report identified that following this escalation “a 
new crisis management team was formed on 31 July to manage the situation” 
(p 8). Our understanding from the emails provided to us by the Director of Risk 
& Compliance (who had returned from holiday on 30th July) in his role as Chair 
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of the Crisis Management team was that this team may not have been fully 
functioning until 2nd August. However, when it was formed, the Crisis 
Management team included all relevant OCR directors as well as the Head of 
the Examinations & Assessor team and the Head of Assessment Standards. It 
also included the Chief Executive/Responsible Officer who had been contacted 
by OCR colleagues and had returned from leave early on 2nd August.  
Area of investigation 3: the awareness and understanding of OCR 
management through the summer of risks to delivering marking on 
time 
Decision-making in response to issues affecting marking 
86. A key decision in relation to the scoris web assessor functionality incident in 
early June was whether to revert to the classic platform. The evidence suggests 
that OCR drove the decision to revert to scoris classic and was appropriately 
involved in developing the options and more detailed planning for reversion. 
87. Some decisions during the main marking period, the timing of management 
interventions and lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities when 
making those decisions, suggests that more work needs to be done to reinforce 
and embed OCR’s new governance framework. 
88. First, the lack of clarity about the role of the Assessment Management Group in 
effectively managing the marking and understanding, where necessary, where 
to escalate issues. This has been explored in “Area of investigation 2” above. 
89. Second, and linked to the lack of clarity about the Assessment Management 
Group, OCR’s final review report identified that: “The accountability of Senior 
Assessors was… not made clear enough in terms of their responsibility to 
manage the teams to achieve targets…” (p 50, Finding Post-AS14). The finding 
goes on to identify that OCR was “still devising internal processes and working 
instructions at the time we were communicating with assessors”. And: “This 
responsibility of managing teams to achieve marking deadlines had in most 
cases been taken up by the QMs in the past.”  
90. Third, as marking rates deteriorated towards the end of June, it was misjudged, 
in hindsight, not to resort to financial incentives earlier and in a more 
incremental way as marking went further into July. The time taken by OCR 
management to make the decision to offer financial incentives, in face of the 
emerging situation, came late (at least one senior manager acknowledged that 
in hindsight this should have come seven to ten days earlier) and was then 
rapidly extended. OCR’s marking position might have been stronger if the use 
of financial incentives had been more progressively implemented from an earlier 
time. In interview, it was clear that there was a conflict between offering greater 
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financial incentives when, as OCR felt, some assessors were exploiting the 
marking situation. Alongside concerns about the precedent this may set for 
future series. Consideration of these issues contributed to the delay in the 
decision. The proportion of assessors who “took commercial advantage” of 
OCR was not information specifically requested by the investigation.16 
91. Fourth, OCR’s preliminary review report identified as an example of “poor 
quality decision making” the decision at the outset (before marking started) not 
to bring in temporary staff to support the Examinations & Assessor team, 
preferring instead to use overtime to maintain cover. Management stepped in 
late to remedy this. It would appear that the resourcing of the Examinations & 
Assessor team factored in the use, at peak times, of temporary staff. An 
example of this was when Coventry Deployment inherited the panel preparation 
from Cambridge Deployment and had to carry out remedial work. While the 
Director of Assessment Standards agrees it was the wrong decision not to bring 
in temporary staff earlier, the Head of the Examinations & Assessor team does 
not, taking the view that it was better for efficiency and morale of the 
Examinations & Assessor team to use overtime for existing trained staff rather 
than train up temps.  
92. OCR’s final review report stated: “Once this issue was recognised and due to 
the number of new staff transferring to the Coventry Deployment Team a 
decision was made to transfer the temp budget to overtime budget as the 
existing Coventry team felt to work overtime in order to rectify the panels was 
the most efficient option over training new and temporary staff” (p 16, Finding 
Pre-E&A01). Ultimately, due to the scoris functionality issues, a lack of 
resources did affect the level of support that the Examinations & Assessor team 
could provide to assessors calling and emailing about scoris performance 
issues (many were not answered in a timely way). On the flip side, there was 
some support for the view put forward by OCR’s preliminary review report that 
the decision to centralise the Examinations & Assessor team on one site made 
crisis management easier.  
93. Fifth, there may not have been sufficient use made of former qualification 
managers who had experience of closely managing the marking in latter stages 
of the series. On the face of it, the Assessment Management Group action 
matrices show that it was only from 29th July that former qualification managers 
were involved in the daily watch list actions and used to contact assessors 
                                            
 
16 As part of factual accuracy checking of this report, OCR was invited to provide data on the number 
of assessors as a whole or by subject who took commercial advantage of OCR. OCR is of the view 
that the time required to draw out detailed analysis would outweigh the value it would add to the 
report. 
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regarding their availability to mark. It is not possible to know whether earlier 
involvement of a number of former qualification managers in the latter stages of 
marking would have significantly altered the marking situation towards the end 
of July. 
94. Finally, it was only recognised on 2nd August that a number of units on the 
worry list were AS units and so were not entirely made up of candidates who 
were seeking university places. OCR’s preliminary review report stated: “Had 
this been realised sooner resources could have been more effectively targeted 
earlier on.” 
Factors affecting management’s awareness and understanding 
95. A general point in relation to the scoris functionality issues during June is the 
context of OCR operating in a syndicate structure. This arguably means OCR 
relies heavily on a syndicate function (the Group Infrastructure Services 
Directorate) to hold the necessary technical expertise to challenge the 
syndicate’s third-party electronic marking provider about scoris performance. 
This has been explored in more detail in “Area of investigation 1” above. 
96. In relation to assessing the increasing deterioration in marking rates and the 
implications for achieving key marking deadlines during July, there is evidence 
that OCR senior managers worked on the basis of a number of flawed 
understandings and assumptions.  
97. First, that there was insufficient holistic understanding of the end-to-end process 
of marking through to issue of results. When the scoris performance 
functionality issues arose in June there was insufficient awareness at the time, 
or more critically as marking progressed into July, of the link between this and 
the potential impact on, and implications for, achieving marking deadlines later 
on in early August. It is possible that the previous qualification managers would, 
generally, have had this picture. 
98. OCR’s final review report identified that: “There is less evidence of a common 
understanding of, and central responsibility for, the end-to-end awarding and 
marking processes” (p 4). It was evident from interviews and the lack of cross-
business joined-up planning documentation that OCR did not have a strong 
culture of strategic or operational end-to-end approach towards marking for 
summer 2014 – rather, more a silo business approach. The final review report 
went on to identify that: “OCR thinks of itself in organisational/structural terms 
as ‘What Operations does’ and ‘What Assessment Standards does’ rather than 
focusing on the end-to-end process that drives outputs” (p 4). Furthermore, still 
referring to planning and management of risks, the final review report stated: 
“Without a clear understanding of, or responsibility for, the critical milestones 
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throughout the end-to-end process it wasn’t possible to understand the 
consequences of missing them” (p 11). 
99. Second, there was insufficient clarity between the Director of Assessment 
Standards/Head of the Examinations & Assessor team and the Director of 
Operations about whose responsibility it was to ensure that results were 
published to agreed timelines and hence where the primacy of ownership and 
responsibility laid for this. 
100. Third, there was insufficient awareness about the availability of assessors. 
OCR’s own review, supported by interview evidence, identified that not knowing 
that a number of assessors were imminently going on leave or had other 
commitments later on in July, had a particular impact on marking rates at this 
critical time - when completion of marking to key deadlines was already at risk 
in a number of subjects.17  
101. Fourth, OCR did not sufficiently understand the exact definition and expectation 
of UCAS about what the “main results file” to be transferred to UCAS on the 
initial deadline of 7th August meant – particularly, in terms of the percentage of 
GCE marks that should be on this file and what was then acceptable to be sent 
through in subsequent amendment files up to 12th August (the last upload date 
before issue of A level results on 14th August). It would appear that the 
anticipated or acceptable volume of late marks beyond 7th August was not 
clarified between OCR and UCAS until the meeting between OCR, Ofqual and 
UCAS on 31st July. A meeting did take place between OCR Operations and 
UCAS, with follow-up emails, from 25th to 28th July, but this appears to have 
been more about timings of files. Ofqual’s note of the 30th July telephone call 
between Ofqual and the then UCAS Director of Operations shows that when 
asked to give an indication of the percentage of marking missing from the main 
file upload on 7th August that would be “significant” he said 5 per cent, but that 
he would need to talk to colleagues as UCAS did not have an agreed position 
on this.  
102. Key OCR senior managers viewed 12th August as the UCAS critical deadline 
and did not have a clear understanding of UCAS’s expectations about the main 
and amendment mark files. When interviewed, the Head of the Examinations & 
Assessor team appeared unclear about the UCAS dates, but finally referred to 
12th August. The Director of Assessment Standards could not recall the last 
marks upload dates at interview, but they were known to her during the series. 
While not documented by OCR, it was reported to the investigation that an OCR 
                                            
 
17 Refer to sections “Area of investigation 1” and “Area of investigation 2” in this report. 
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manager attended meetings with UCAS in late 2013. The manager reported 
that UCAS pushed for earlier data from the exam boards but was told that 
earlier data would be less complete. UCAS seemed happy with this if it meant it 
could start processing university applications sooner. The UCAS transfer date 
was included in OCR’s General Qualifications Results Processing Schedule that 
was circulated early in 2014, although, as confirmed by the final review report, 
this date “did not subsequently factor into the marking targets or discussions 
once OCR was looking at contingencies to counter delays in marking” (p 53, 
Finding XB01). The final review report also points to an agreement between 
exam boards and UCAS dated June 2013 that implies that UCAS accepted that 
the initial data file would not be complete and that no statement as to the 
acceptable completeness of the initial (main) file was provided (p 53, Finding 
XB01). 
103. However, on 11th July, the Chief Executive of UCAS wrote to OCR’s Chief 
Executive stating: “We have reached the point in the annual cycle of events 
where I write to you to seek your assurance that there are no anticipated issues 
with the supply of results to UCAS in early August.” The letter went on to state: 
“The agreement that we have with you, through [JCQ], stipulates that UCAS 
must receive your results information in the agreed format by 12 o’clock noon 
on Thursday 7 August.” On 31st July, OCR’s Director of Operations emailed 
UCAS confirming that OCR “will issue the main file with results information by 
mid-day 7th August. Any amendment files will start Saturday 9th August.” While 
there is nothing in the letter that defines the percentage of marks in that main 
file (UCAS’s expectations of the completeness of marks on 7th August), it 
implies that the expectation is for complete matched data for all subjects so it 
can be made available to universities on 9th August, rather than incomplete 
data.18 
104. OCR demonstrated a lack of understanding of the critical role that the data from 
exam boards plays in the very early days of allocating university places. It 
appears that only after the joint meeting between OCR, Ofqual and UCAS on 
31st July did OCR senior managers understand fully the significant effect that 
an anticipated shortfall of marked A level papers would have on a significant 
percentage of students going into clearing.  
                                            
 
18 As part of factual accuracy checking, OCR has made two points about this statement. First, custom 
and practice of providing data to UCAS over a number of years does not bear out this statement. 
Second, OCR cannot reasonably be expected to infer from the tone of a letter what it is that UCAS 
requires. Rather, we would expect the requirement to be explicit. 
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105. OCR’s final review report stated: “OCR had no way of knowing that certain 
number of missing results could impact upon clearing in the manner referenced 
by UCAS at a meeting between OCR, DfE [Department for Education], Ofqual 
and UCAS on 31 July. This meeting was the first time UCAS mentioned such a 
threshold and impact” (p 53, Finding XB01). However, it should be noted that 
the 11th July letter from UCAS to OCR (referred to above) clearly identified that: 
“The admissions process has a critical dependency on your supply of results 
and any delay or problems with the format or contents of results files could have 
a significant impact on the admissions process…” OCR did not have a level of 
understanding about the impact that missing results could have on A level 
students in the university admissions process. The investigation recognises that 
it is not known whether senior managers in other exam boards have this 
understanding. This, in turn, raises the perspective of the industry-wide nature 
of this situation and the need to explore whether greater cross-industry clarity 
on this issue is needed. 
106. Fifth, there was also a lack of understanding of some end-of-marking business 
processes that are necessary for the completion of marking and therefore the 
issuing of results. Key senior management at OCR acknowledged not fully 
understanding some end-of-marking processes that affected delivery of results 
to centres, such as the completion of marking necessary for the calculation of Z 
scores and realisation that some AS units could contribute to aggregation for A 
level candidates. With reference to the reconciliation of marking processes, 
OCR’s final review report identified that: “This is a complex process which 
requires input from E&A and Ops. There are no clear lines of responsibility with 
regards to the tasks necessary at the end of the marking period…” (p 31, 
Finding Post-A&A07). And: “E&A did not understand its role in this process…” 
The report also stated: “Due to the complex process the ownership of this will 
never be clear.” 
107. In addition, OCR’s final review report identified that the “current arrangements 
for monitoring examiners who have been stopped post-standardisation do not 
support effective pre-results checks” (p 27, Finding Post-AP02). This hampered 
the timely and accurate provision of information to Operations so that 
incomplete re-marks could be suppressed through the use of the Q score 
(pending status).  
108. Sixth, on 25th July, Ofqual received very late notification from OCR’s Director of 
Assessment Standards that there was a risk OCR could not provide all the A 
level outcome data (deadline 28th July) in compliance with Ofqual’s data 
exchange document, which is published as a regulatory document. Ultimately, 
OCR did manage to comply. The data exchange outcome data deadlines were 
not identified on OCR’s June 2014 GQ Results Processing Schedule, which 
identified all key summer series dates, which may have contributed to what 
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appears to be a lack of visibility about the deadlines from some senior 
managers.19  
109. Seventh, senior assessors, as a body, did not fully understand their role in 
managing progress of marking within their teams. In addition, it is probable that 
it was not fully understood that some senior assessors needed more support 
than others to use scoris and prepare for standardisation meetings. OCR’s final 
review report identified that: “The accountability of Senior Assessors was… not 
made clear enough in terms of their responsibility to manage the teams to 
achieve targets…” (p 50, Finding Post-AS14). The finding goes on to identify 
that OCR was “still devising internal processes and working instructions at the 
time we were communicating with assessors”. And: “This responsibility of 
managing teams to achieve marking deadlines had in most cases been taken 
up by the QMs in the past.”20 OCR’s final review report stated: “What became 
evident was… some senior examiners had become over reliant on the QM/L 
[Qualification Managers/Leaders]….” (p 30, Finding Post-E&A04).  
110. Eighth, the degree of support required by assessors in terms of queries during a 
summer series was not understood. In previous series, a majority of these 
would have been dealt with by the quality managers. This resulted in the 
Examinations & Assessor team having unexpected demand, without more 
resources, placed on parts of the team, particularly deployment and monitoring 
and support functions. The impact was confirmed by OCR’s final review report: 
“Es&As did not receive the support we aimed to provide because calls and 
emails coming in to E&A were not always answered in a timely fashion… 
resulting in us not meeting our SLA [service level agreement] to Es&As” (p 32, 
Finding Post-E7A09). 
111. Another factor that may have affected some senior managers’ awareness and 
understanding is the lack of experience in their current roles of managing 
marking and awarding of an OCR GQ summer series. We understand that a 
number of the top team, specifically the Director of Assessment Standards and 
the Head of the Examinations & Assessor team, had not been in their current 
roles managing an OCR GCSE and A level summer series of marking and 
awarding before summer 2014. The Director of Assessment Standards was 
OCR’s previous Head of 14–19 Qualifications a number of years ago, and 
previous to her current role was the Responsible Officer equivalent in Bahrain 
                                            
 
19 There is more detail about this in the section “Area of investigation 5” in this report. 
20 Ofqual has not seen any documentation that outlines the scope of the Senior Assessor’s 
responsibility to manage teams to achieve targets, so it is difficult to assess the weight of this finding. 
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overseeing the whole process and standards. The Head of the Examinations & 
Assessor team was appointed Interim Head of Assessor Management in April 
2013. However, for the 2013 summer series these responsibilities did not 
include deployment and monitoring of assessors.  
112. Finally, the holiday absence of some key senior managers during June, July 
and early August could also have impacted on their awareness and 
understanding of both scoris performance issues and when marking rates 
deteriorated. Our understanding is that the Head of Assessment Standards was 
on leave from 2nd to 12th June, the Director of Operations was on leave from 
23rd to 27th June, and the Director of Risk & Compliance returned from ten 
days’ leave on 30th July.  
113. We also understand that the Chief Executive Officer/Responsible Officer started 
leave on 27th July, intending to return around 9th August. He returned from 
leave for the meeting of the Management Board for GCSE and A Level Reform 
in London on 30th July, then returned to his holiday. In interview, the Chief 
Executive Officer stated that he was in communication with his senior managers 
and returned from leave on 2nd August to join the Crisis Management team.  
Area of investigation 4: accuracy and completeness of OCR’s 
reporting to Ofqual through the summer incident 
114. OCR’s chronology of events indicates that OCR first informed Ofqual of the 
scoris performance issues on 2nd June (preliminary review report, Appendix 1). 
Our records show that 6th June was the first recorded notification (an email to 
the Acting Director of Regulatory Operations), followed by an event notification 
on 13th June. It was probable that in the first week in June, OCR, the 
Infrastructure Services Directorate and RM did not fully understand the nature 
or scale, and therefore the implication, of the emerging functionality issues. A 
number of interviewees expressed the view that they found it difficult to get 
satisfactory responses from the Infrastructure Services Directorate and RM. 
OCR’s final review report stated: “As a result of system problems with scoris 
web assessor approximately 10 marking days were lost. It was a number of 
days before the full extent of the problems was identified” (p 30, Finding Post-
E&A05). And: “It was not clear during the early part of the marking window as to 
the precise nature of the problem unfolding. There was a considerable amount 
of ‘noise’ coming into OCR… This intelligence was not collated in a central point 
and hence early warning of the impending problem was missed” (p 49, Finding 
Post AS13). However, by 10th/11th June, OCR, RM and Infrastructure Services 
Directorate crisis teams had been formed. Towards the end of the second 
week, OCR provided more detailed daily updates on scoris performance as it 
developed a better understanding of what the performance issues were and the 
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effectiveness of solutions being adopted by RM and the Infrastructure Services 
Directorate.  
115. During the week commencing 16th June, OCR’s daily email updates to Ofqual 
included a range of information required by Ofqual: total number of 
standardisation meetings completed relative to plan and 2013; percentage 
cumulative marking completed; churn rate of markers in 2014 relative to plan 
and 2013; total panel vacancies relative to 2013; and components being 
switched to scoris classic. The 17th June data identified that: the cumulative 
percentage of marking completed was 18.18 per cent, compared to 19.30 per 
cent at the same point in 2013; the dropout of assessors had risen from 1,024 
the day before to 1,068 on 17th June, compared with 664 in the same week in 
2013; and there were 1,092 panel vacancies (7.05 per cent) compared with 743 
(5.6 per cent) at the same point in 2013. On 19th June, the Director of Risk & 
Compliance in an email update confirmed that OCR was “close to returning to a 
business as usual operation”. In addition, he advised that, given that the focus 
was now on marking rates, information on panel vacancies and marker churn 
rates had been excluded. He also confirmed that total percentage of marks 
received was 22.63 per cent, compared with 22.62 per cent at the same point in 
2013.  
116. On 20th June, it was agreed at a teleconference between Ofqual and OCR that 
OCR’s daily reporting would be replaced with weekly reporting (every Friday) – 
reporting the total number of standardisation meetings completed, cumulative 
percentage marking completed, and system stability. On 25th June, Ofqual 
wrote to OCR summarising the teleconference that took place on the 20th June 
and requesting a further teleconference on 27th June and also that OCR 
provide on a weekly basis, starting 3rd July, the percentage of marks on file at 
the time of each award. OCR provided this data by updating an Ofqual template 
each Friday (with the exception of the first Friday where OCR explained that no 
awards had taken place as several had been rescheduled). 
117. On 27th June, OCR reported to Ofqual that it was back on track. As a result, 
Ofqual stood its incident down, not requiring daily or regular reporting of scoris 
performance-related data other than the percentage of marks on file. Over the 
next two weeks or so, two further marking issues (double marking and special 
consideration issues) were reported to Ofqual. Following this, on 15th July, 
Ofqual requested further marking data from OCR (specifically the percentage of 
marking completed by component compared to the same point last year) and 
information about marking tolerances. On 17th July, OCR responded asking 
why we wanted this information (our email did not explain why), given that it had 
agreed with Ofqual that the only reporting would be weekly percentage of marks 
on file at time of award. A further email exchange took place on 17th July 
providing some clarification to OCR, but OCR continued to challenge the 
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request. Ofqual sent a final email advising OCR that Ofqual would meet with 
OCR the following day to take this request forward.  
118. OCR expressed concern that from its perspective, the request for data 
distracted from what it was trying to achieve and pressed Ofqual for a rationale. 
When Ofqual met with OCR, OCR provided Ofqual with the scoris dashboard 
and watch lists, among other information. This marking data could have been 
offered earlier. OCR expressed to the investigation that it took some time for 
Ofqual to clarify the reasons for its request so that OCR understood the 
reasons. When clarification was given, the data was provided promptly. 
119. Following Ofqual’s meeting on 18th July, OCR agreed to provide the scoris 
dashboard and watch lists on a weekly basis. From 26th July, OCR complied 
with Ofqual’s request to provide the scoris dashboard and watch lists on a daily 
basis. 
120. The data and other information contained within the scoris dashboard and 
watch lists were based on best available marking rate data (OCR’s cautioned 
that all live time data can be affected by small time delays). The data was based 
on an automated system using previous days/weeks marking rates and then 
RAG-rated dependent on/prioritised against the award date. When Ofqual 
requested the dashboard and watch lists from 18th July, the same dashboard 
and watch lists were provided as those provided to OCR senior managers. 
121. In early July, OCR notified Ofqual of a double-marking issue. OCR’s timeline of 
key events in its preliminary review report indicates that it notified the regulators 
of a double-marking issue on 8th July. It is unclear how this was done as we 
have formal notification of this incident recorded as 9th July.21 
122. In relation to the special consideration issue, OCR’s own timeline does not 
record the date it first notified us of this, but we have formal notification 
recorded as 11th July. 
123. On 24th July, two members of the Screening team in OCR’s Research and 
Technical Standards identified concerns to OCR’s Risk & Compliance team that 
imminent deadlines for providing results data to Ofqual and UCAS would be 
missed due to marking shortfalls. The Risk & Compliance team escalated the 
issue (by email) to the Chief Executive Officer, the Director of Risk & 
                                            
 
21 OCR, as part of the factual accuracy checking, stated that it believes the preliminary review report 
cited an incorrect date. It gave the date that OCR circulated its internal draft notification rather than the 
date that the formal notification went to Ofqual. 
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Compliance (who was on leave), the Director of Operations and the Director of 
Assessment Standards.  
124. On 25th July, OCR notified Ofqual by email that outcome data for 13 A level 
specifications were at risk of not being submitted to Ofqual in line with the 
summer 2014 GCSE and A level data exchange document (published as a 
regulatory document). The deadline for submission was 10.00am on 28th July. 
Ultimately, all specification outcome data was provided by the submission date, 
although for several subjects it was not fully complete. (It excluded partial 
absences – but OCR had made Ofqual aware this might be the case some 
months earlier. At that point, it was accepted in principle, as it was not 
considered to materially affect the review of outcomes.) However, the data 
exchange submission deadlines were not identified within OCR’s summer 2014 
GQ Results Processing Schedule, which identified key summer series 
deadlines. OCR’s final review report, referring to awareness of Ofqual data 
requirements, identified that “there is perhaps not sufficient awareness outside 
of Assessment Standards [of] the importance of all of the dates and particularly 
as happened in the summer, the implications for not having sufficient data 
available at the given date” (p 54, Finding XB02). 
Area of investigation 5: whether OCR provided appropriate 
assurance to Ofqual through the summer marking incident 
125. There were a number of points during June and July where OCR provided 
information (either by email or recorded when summarising a meeting with 
OCR) that Ofqual could reasonably take as assurances.  
126. First, an assurance in relation to the scoris web assessor functionality issues. 
On 9th June, OCR’s Director of Risk & Compliance provided an email update to 
Ofqual (Compliance & Monitoring team) about the scoris performance issues, 
stating: “Given the early stage of marking within OCR, overall marking progress 
remains on track.” Although it was probable that marking had been affected by 
the functionality issues, and indeed continued to be during June (OCR’s final 
review report stated that ten marking days were lost), given the relatively early 
point of marking then it would be difficult to prove that “overall” marking was not 
still on track at this point.  
127. The email went on to say: “The solutions identified on Friday were successful 
with performance back to the levels expected.” A review of communications 
between the Infrastructure Services Directorate and OCR does bring into 
question whether this was appropriate in terms of providing the full picture. On 
9th June, the Director of Risk & Compliance circulated an options paper about 
what the Plan B should be: “Given the performance of issues noted during this 
last week, OCR needs to be clear on what its Plan B is if the issues continue 
and performance is unacceptable.” Also, later that day, an email from the 
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Infrastructure Services Directorate to OCR (the Director of Operations but not 
including the Director of Risk & Compliance) identified that, while the platform 
continued to operate comfortably within capabilities, “there remains a small 
number of significant functional issues that occur consistently”. On 10th June, 
RM’s help desk extended its opening hours from 09.00 to 22.00 until further 
notice. An email on 11th June from the Infrastructure Services Directorate to 
crisis team members (but not including the Director of Risk & Compliance) 
referred to having to agree a clear implementation plan for switching to scoris 
classic. Another email (but again not including the Director of Risk & 
Compliance) stated: “RM believes that so far 25% of the untrustworthy 
constraints in the database have been updated and are now trusted.” 
128. Second, an assurance about meeting awarding deadlines in an email of 18th 
June from OCR’s Director of Risk & Compliance to Ofqual as part of OCR’s 
daily updates22 stated: “We are watching this very closely and clearly will be 
taking actions where we believe that there is a heightened risk that we might not 
hit the Awarding and Last Marks Upload deadlines. At the moment we are 
confident that we can still meet these deadlines but of course this picture varies 
day to day as we progress further into the marking phase and more units have 
their marking completed.” Although this assurance is caveated with “the picture 
varies day to day”, at this point it did not appear to fully consider the future 
potential implications of assessor dropout and panel vacancy data identified in 
OCR’s daily update email of 17th June to Ofqual. In addition, at this point in 
June, as confirmed by OCR’s final review report, a significant number of 
marking days had been lost (p 30, Finding Post-E&A05). In interview, the 
Director of Risk & Compliance acknowledged that with hindsight assurances 
provided to Ofqual were overly optimistic, but they were genuinely based on 
OCR’s understanding of the management information it had. 
129. Third, there were statements from OCR, contained within daily scoris 
performance updates on 19th and 20th June, that OCR was close to returning 
to business as usual. Both confirmed that standardisation meetings continued to 
complete on time and to plan during the day, that cumulative percentage 
marking completed for all subjects was very close to the same point last year, 
and that the system was stable. However, OCR also identified that it was 
concerned about 22 per cent of the total number of units where standardisation 
was complete where an interim or final marking deadline had not been met or 
was in danger of not being met. It is not clear from the information how this 22 
per cent compares with the same point last year, but the 19th June reference 
                                            
 
22 This assurance was also referred to by the Chief Regulator in her letter to OCR’s Chief Executive 
Officer on 6th August. 
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does identify that the number of units had risen by nine (16 per cent) since the 
previous day. However, the email is also caveated that all figures fluctuate on a 
daily basis and so not to read too much into individual figures. 
130. Fourth, Ofqual’s Summary of OCR’s Issues Summer 2014 stated: “OCR gave 
assurance on 27th June it was back to business as usual levels and it had not 
experienced any further performance issues with scoris during the week.” It is 
not clear whether this assurance is referring to the performance of scoris or 
marking rates (compared to same point last year), or both. Ofqual’s specific 
note of the afternoon meeting on 27th June between Ofqual (Entry, Exit & 
Enforcement Manager and Monitoring Manager) and OCR (Chief Executive 
Officer and Director of Assessment Standards) does not record use of the 
words “assurance” or “back to business as usual levels”. However, the 
information provided by OCR strongly suggested that scoris was performing 
properly and that marking was not an issue for concern: “…that 33% of marks 
were now on the system.23 This is slightly behind the position in 2013 but 
nothing that OCR is concerned by.”  
131. Fifth, on 8th July, OCR (in an email from the Director of Assessment Standards) 
provided a response to Ofqual’s request for assurance following OCR’s 
notification that a number of award dates had been rescheduled. OCR stated: 
“The more we move into the middle and towards the end of the session the less 
likely it is that we will move award dates. I would think that it would be highly 
unlikely that we will move any awards after the end of this month.” It concluded 
by saying “and to reassure Ofqual that we are on track to meet all of the key 
dates for awarding this summer”.24 However, on 14th July, OCR sent an 
updated awarding schedule (in response to Ofqual checking, as part of the data 
exchange procedures, why OCR had not submitted some outcome data 
following award meetings) showing a further 12 GCSEs and three GCEs with 
changed awarding dates. In ten of these (almost all GCSE) the award date was 
pushed back, several by a significant number of days. The Director of 
Assessment Standards stated that she was not aware of any rescheduled 
award dates other than the ones notified more formally to Ofqual on 3rd and 4th 
                                            
 
23 The problems with scoris assessor functionality from early June through to when performance 
stabilised in mid to late June did have an impact on marking rates as June progressed into July and 
towards marking completion deadlines. Yet while linked they are also separate incidents and should 
not necessarily be conflated when considering the evidence. 
24 This assurance was also referred to by the Chief Regulator in her letter to OCR’s Chief Executive 
Officer on 6th August and copied to the Minister Nick Gibb. 
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July. We have not been able to determine whether these awards were 
rescheduled before or after the assurance given on 8th July. 
132. We identified a total of 19 award meetings delayed (counting GCSE Geography 
B twice as it was delayed twice). In her email of 29th October, the Director of 
Assessment Standards said that she thought only 16 award meetings had been 
delayed, noting that this was a low proportion (8 per cent) of the total number of 
award meetings (192) and “would not judge that as significant”. She added that 
nine of these meetings were delayed because of scoris issues. These delayed 
meetings were “one day’s worth of screening”. As OCR had “more than one day 
screening contingency” in its awarding schedule, these delays were “not an 
indication of seriousness”.  
133. Although this analysis is accurate, it does not acknowledge the relatively high 
proportion of award meetings scheduled for early July that were delayed. Our 
analysis of awarding meeting data shows the following: 
 All of the first five award meetings (26th June to 8th July) were delayed – 
although OCR attributed only one delay to scoris-related issues. 
 Up to and including 16th July there were 18 award meetings originally 
scheduled, 11 of which were delayed – four due to scoris-related issues. 
 Ninety-nine of the 122 GCE award meetings were always scheduled to 
take place in the very last week of OCR’s awarding schedule (21st to 25th 
July), where the scope to delay these meetings is much less if marking 
deadlines are to be achieved. 
134. These delays could have been an early warning indicator of the marking issues 
that materialised later in July. However, we do not know how many award 
meetings were rescheduled in previous summer series due to changes in 
OCR’s auditing of its awarding schedule. Without this data it is not possible to 
determine if this situation with delayed awarding meetings in the first half of July 
was unusual. 
135. OCR’s final review report also made some relevant findings. First, it identified 
that: “Daily AMG meetings identified at risk qualifications in terms of having less 
than 85% of the marks on the system in time for the award, however as this 
data was at unit level only it did not account for the number of aggregated 
candidates at qualification level. In many cases where individual units were 
above 85%… the overall % of graded candidates (aggregated) was below 85% 
and the awards could not be screened” (p 36, Finding Post AS05). Second: 
“Whilst delays to awards on the whole were due to insufficient marks available 
at the time of the meetings, a number of other issues had a significant impact 
on the timely running of award meetings. The resource requirement for the 
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agreed support to awarding… was underestimated” (p 37, Finding Post-AS06). 
Third, it identified that: “In the June 2013 series Chairs reported ‘any other 
difficulties at award’ for 27 specifications, in June 2014 this increased to 81 
specifications.” Fourth, it identified that: “OCR’s awarding schedules (based on 
old business rules) did not have enough in-built contingency to account for the 
impact of changed processes and unforeseen marking issues” (p 36, Finding 
Post-AS03).  
136. Another indicator of marking progress is the proportion of whole candidate 
marks on file at the time of each award. The data provided to us as part of data 
exchange showed 20325 GCSE and GCE awards made in summer 2014. Of 
these, 37 awards (18 per cent) were made with fewer than 85 per cent of 
candidate marks on file at the time of the award meeting. In comparison, in 
summer 2013 only around eight award meetings (4 per cent) were made with 
fewer than 85 per cent of candidate marks on file. However, of the 37 awards 
that took place with fewer than 85 per cent of marks on file, only one meeting 
took place in the first week of awarding, four meetings in the second week and 
32 in the third and final week – therefore, arguably, this had limited use as an 
early warning indicator. 
137. However, if we look below the 85 per cent benchmark to the awards where 
there was a significantly lower percentage of marks on file than for the same 
award in summer 2013, the data shows a marking ‘gap’ emerging by mid-July. 
Our analysis indicates that in summer 2014, 51 awards were made with 
significantly fewer whole candidate marks on file at the time of the award 
meeting than in summer 2013.26 In the first week of awarding there was only 
one such award. But in week two (15th to 21st July) there were ten awards: five 
where the difference was between 5 and 10 per cent, and five where the 
difference was greater than 20 per cent. This was an indicator that in some 
subjects, significantly less marking progress had been made than at the same 
point in summer 2013. This picture became more marked by the final week of 
                                            
 
25 Figures differ from the total cited by OCR (192). This is due to differences in methodology – for 
example, we have counted the eight different GCSE Art & Design specifications as separate awards.  
26 For the purposes of our analysis, we have assumed that all of the 2013 award meeting dates were 
held on the same dates as the summer 2014 schedule. We have defined a “significant” difference as 
greater than 5 per cent – for example, 90 per cent of marks on file in summer 2013, 85 per cent in 
summer 2014. OCR has questioned the above assumption, stating that the factors that affect 
awarding dates are many and varied, and it is unlikely that awarding meetings were scheduled on the 
same day. 
 Ofqual Investigation into OCR’s Summer 2014 
GCSE and A Level Marking Issues – Findings 
Ofqual 2015 45 
summer 2014 awarding, with 40 awards made where the proportion of marks on 
file was at least 5 per cent lower than in summer 2013. 
138. Sixth, on 18th July, Ofqual met with OCR. The note of that meeting records the 
following: 
 Eighty-three per cent of scripts had been marked compared to 89 per cent 
on same day in 2013. OCR had marked over 500,000 more scripts than at 
the same point last year, given that the total volume to be marked in 2014 
was significantly higher than in 2013. There were approximately 200,000 
GCE scripts and 300,000 GCSE scripts still to be marked.  
 OCR stated that it did not have visibility of individual assessors’ marking 
plans. 
 OCR noted that it had a slower start to marking due to scoris performance 
issues. 
139. OCR also stated that at that time there was no GCSE/GCE qualification where it 
was believed that results would not be ready in time for results day. In interview, 
the Director of Assessment Standards stated that what she meant was that all 
results would be with centres by results day. The watch (worry) list for 18th July 
showed 22 GCE units with projected completion of marking dates at current 
daily/weekly rate beyond even the very latest last mark upload to UCAS 
deadline (12th August) and about half of those had less than 70 per cent of 
marking completed. Also there were five GCSE units (not including another five 
where dates were entered as “unknown”) beyond 18th August (the deadline on 
the GQ Processing Schedule), with only one being above 70 per cent marking 
complete. 
140. In addition, OCR’s final review report identified that: “Marking once again began 
to deteriorate in the week of 14 July and the traditional tools available to OCR 
such as the instigation of marking centres… were deployed. However, the 
impact on marking rates of these interventions was slow and failed to have a 
material impact on marking rates ahead of one of the regular marking updates 
meetings with Ofqual on 18 July” (p 8). There are two points about this 
statement. First, it gives a sense that Ofqual and OCR were holding regular 
update meetings at this point in July. This was not the case: the only reason this 
meeting occurred was at Ofqual’s insistence, due to OCR failing to provide 
information requested in previous days.27 Second, this suggests that OCR’s 
                                            
 
27 See the section “Area of investigation 4” (paragraph 94) in this report, which also outlines OCR’s 
different perspective to that of the investigation team. 
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“traditional tools” were not enough to deal with a larger than anticipated 
assessor shortfall, although OCR expressed the view that it had no grounds to 
believe that the “traditional tools” were not enough to deal with the shortfalls that 
arose. 
141. On 24th July, it was identified that imminent deadlines for providing results data 
to Ofqual and UCAS would be missed due to marking shortfalls. OCR’s final 
review report identified that following this escalation “a new crisis management 
team was formed on 31st July to manage the situation” (p 8). There are two 
points about this. First, following escalation, it is unclear why members of the 
Research and Technical team felt compelled to escalate this and why, as it also 
appears, senior managers had not already identified the risk and acted upon 
this (for example, by bringing the Crisis Management team together earlier). No 
explanation has been provided for why this was the case. Second, our 
understanding from the emails provided to us by the Director of Risk & 
Compliance (who returned from holiday on 30th July) in his role as Chair of the 
Crisis Management team was that this team may not have been fully functioning 
until 2nd August.  
142. Seventh, on 25th July, there were morning and afternoon teleconferences 
between Ofqual and OCR. The note of the afternoon conference records OCR 
stating: “They remain confident that all GCE and GCSE marking will be 
complete in time for the results days.” In interview, OCR explained that it was 
meant that all results would be with centres by results day. At this 
teleconference, OCR agreed to contact other exam boards regarding the 
possibility of using their assessors for GCSE and GCE English Literature and 
GCE Biology. Ofqual also received the first weekly update (as agreed at the 
18th July meeting), which showed that the gap between percentage of marking 
completed at the same time last year, which had been 6 per cent on 18th July, 
was just 4 per cent. Sixteen GCE units were identified as high risk in terms of 
completion of marking (Ofqual document OCR Issues – Summer 2014). The 
25th July watch (worry) list showed ten GCE units with projected completion 
dates beyond even 12th August (with six history units with projected completion 
dates into September/October or beyond) and four GCSE units (English 
Literature and History) with projected completion dates into September through 
to November.  
143. On 26th July, a daily update on marking progress from OCR (from the Director 
of Assessment Standards forwarding an email from the Manager Data 
Reporting) identified that with 14 days to go before GCE Last Marks Load 
(working to a UCAS marks upload date of 7th August), there were 74,439 GCE 
script marks outstanding. This meant that 5,319 marks per day were required. It 
identified that the previous day’s rate of marks on the system was over 7,000. 
For GCSE, 131,938 marks were outstanding, requiring a daily rate of 6,283, 
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with over 15,000 marks having been put onto the system in the previous day. 
The daily update on 27th July showed the previous day’s rate of marks being 
entered onto OCR’s system as still above the daily required rate – 5,950 for 
GCE and 12,950 for GCSE. On 28th July, OCR offered to pay assessors 
the script marking rate for units most at risk.  
144. Eighth, on 30th July, further assurance was offered by OCR – first, at the 
meeting of the Management Board for GCSE and A Level Reform in London, 
attended by Ofqual’s Chief Regulator. She reported (by email) that OCR’s Chief 
Executive Offiver had attended the meeting (although on holiday) and had 
stated that OCR “were expecting to finish marking ahead of results day but he 
was less sure of his facts on the UCAS deadline”. Second, the note of the 
afternoon teleconference between Ofqual and OCR records that OCR was still 
achieving the necessary daily marks for both GCSE and GCE. Resources had 
been found to identify assessors who had previously dropped out of marking 
and to contact them by telephone. In addition, 100 AQA assessors were 
available to mark GCSE English scripts and some CIE assessors would shortly 
start to mark GCE Biology scripts. The Director of Assessment Standards 
stated that OCR remained “quite confident” that all GCE marking would be 
complete in time for results day. In interview, the Director of Assessment 
Standards stated that she meant getting all results to centres by results day. 
The 29th July watch (worry) list shows eight GCE units with projected marking 
completion after the 12th August UCAS last marks deadline. 
145. On 1st August, a joint meeting between Ofqual, OCR and UCAS took place in 
London. UCAS joined the Ofqual/OCR daily teleconferences. OCR identified 
four GCE subjects (English Literature, Geography, History and Sociology) that 
were not expected to have marking completed in time for the main file upload to 
UCAS on 7th August. Part of OCR’s plan to address this included offering 
assessors times the normal script marking payment as incentives to 
assessors. 
146. On 4th August, based on the latest data from OCR and that UCAS now 
believed the marking situation was manageable, Ofqual took the view that OCR 
was likely to meet UCAS’s expectation of main file upload date of 6th to 7th 
August. 
147. In interview, the Director of Assessment Standards was asked for the rationale 
as to why she was confident about achieving marking deadlines and why this 
justified the assurances given to Ofqual. She stated that it came from being 
sighted on all relevant daily marking progress data and believing, as did her 
managers, that tried and tested means of increasing marking rates where 
necessary, such as increasing allocations to existing markers and use of 
financial incentives, would work as they had done in previous series. She 
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believed in the assurances being given, but stated that providing assurance is a 
difficult judgement and she had to consider factors such as the usual last-
minute rush of marking that can bring marking within completion, and as such it 
is important to “hold your nerve”. There was an acknowledgement that, in 
hindsight, the assurances were overly optimistic and naive.  
148. The Director of Risk & Compliance in interview also acknowledged that OCR’s 
confidence about ultimately making all the marking deadlines was, in hindsight, 
overly optimistic. This was based on OCR’s understanding of the management 
information it had. 
149. OCR’s final review report identified that the Director of Operations “did not feel 
he was aware of the lateness of the marking at the end of July, despite 
receiving the Watch list every day. The level of detail in the Watch list, allied to 
the lack of reference to the significant dates for data submission, would not 
have highlighted the seriousness of the marking delays without additional 
detailed analyses” (p55, Finding XB04). The final review report stated: “An 
appropriately focussed assessment of the current status of key elements of the 
series was not available to senior management.” While the watch lists provided 
to us by OCR do not show significant dates for submission of data, this position 
is still difficult to understand given that the projected marking completion dates 
based on the previous 24-hour and weekly marking rates are clearly shown in 
the July watch (worry) list and many of these dates were shown as well beyond 
results days in August.  
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